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Maintaining a Safe Environment 
for Payment Cards: 




On April 23 and 24, 2008, the Payment Cards Center of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia and the Electronic Funds Transfer Association jointly hosted “Maintaining 
a Safe Environment for Payment Cards:  Examining Evolving Threats Posed by Fraud.” 
The conference included panels representing four key constituencies: issuers, consum-
ers, merchants/acquirers, and networks. The panelists addressed the nature of payment 
card fraud in the 21st century. This paper summarizes the highlights from the presenta-
tions and the discussions that ensued.
 
The views expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Phila-
delphia or the Federal Reserve System. 
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I. Introduction 
  On April 23 and 24, 2008, nearly 100 
interested parties and experts on the topic of  
payment card fraud convened at the Philadelphia 
Federal Reserve Bank to attend a conference 
sponsored by the Payment Cards Center and the 
Electronic Funds Transfer Association (EFTA).  
The conference,  “Maintaining a Safe Environ-
ment for Payment Cards:  Examining Evolving 
Threats Posed by Fraud,” was designed both to  
continue discussion of topics that emerged from a 
September 2006 conference on data breaches and 
to identify new trends and developments that had 
materialized in the interval.  From the discussions 
during the day-and-a-half conference, the follow-
ing key themes emerged:
•	 Reconsideration of Chip-Card Technology.  
The mantra of the past two decades has been 
that smart cards are “a solution in search of a 
problem.” From opinions voiced at this confer-
ence, there may be recognition that the prob-
lem to be solved by chip cards has presented 
itself in the form of mitigating fraud.  As more 
of the world becomes chip-card enabled, fraud 
has migrated to areas with magnetic-stripe 
technology or to venues such as the Internet, 
where physical card presence isn’t required.  
Additionally, the bifurcation of mag-stripe 
technology in the U.S. and chip cards in other 
parts of the world poses challenges to global 
interoperability within the card payment 
system.  While the challenges and limitations 
of chip cards were noted (infrastructure cost, 
irrelevant in current card-not-present environ-
ments), several panelists and conferees indi-
cated (some even expressed it as “inevitable”) 
that the U.S. may adopt chip technology in 
the future.
•	 Adoption of Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standards (PCI-DSS).  After a 
slow start, merchants have accelerated their 
compliance with PCI-DSS (more commonly 
referred to simply as PCI) requirements pro-
mulgated by the major credit and debit card 
networks.  However, PCI compliance is not a 
“one and done” solution, but rather an ongo-
ing process requiring continual vigilance.
•	 Sophisticated Fraud Rings Employing Ad-
vanced Technology.  The fraudsters of today 
are organized professionals using much of 
the same technology employed by legitimate 
industry.  Fraudsters employ variations of 
models used in the legitimate business world 
to conduct their activity:  databases that mir-
ror credit bureaus; creation of value-added 
information by matching and appending data 
elements, similar to what legitimate data ag-
gregators do, but using compromised records; 
and the sale of information, even using time-
sharing techniques such as those employed by 
lawful enterprises to provide illicit access to 
data.  Sophisticated fraud rings operate in an 
illegal “parallel universe” to the payments in-
dustry, using many of its tools and techniques.
•	 Fraud Is Dynamic, Seeks Path of Least 
Resistance.  Fraud mitigation is often, by 
definition, reactive as criminals learn to avoid 
better secured access points and instead target 
weaker products, channels, and geographies.  
Recognizing that thieves maneuver across 
products and channels to perpetrate fraud 
and  that multiservice households expect to 
be protected against fraud across the entire 
relationship, full-service financial institutions 
(FIs) are transforming their fraud management 
structure to traverse product, channel, and 
platform silos within their organizations.
•	 Growth, Complexity, and Need for Greater 
Cooperation and Coordination to Achieve 
Solutions.  Payment card usage has become 
more universal and more complex.  E-com-
merce and electronic banking have spawned a 
proliferation of end-points.  Greater electroni-
fication of information makes the capturing of 
information vulnerable while the information 
is “in transit” or “at rest.”  Increased complex-
ity also means that there is no “magic bullet” 
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fraud entails multivariate solutions requiring 
the cooperation and collaboration of all play-
ers within the payments chain but recognizes 
that theft of confidential information occurs 
from repositories that are outside the financial 
services domain (e.g., hospitals, colleges, and 
government entities).
•	 Consumers’ Role in Mitigating Fraud.  
Identity theft and retailer data breaches have 
been highly publicized in the popular press 
in recent years, raising awareness among the 
general public about the risks that can affect 
individuals.  Consumers indicate that they 
want to be involved in securing their informa-
tion, but they don’t always act in their own 
best interests (e.g., responding to phishing 
attacks by providing their personal informa-
tion).  Networks, acquirers, and card issuers 
are interested in having consumers involved in 
fraud-prevention strategies, but zero liability 
protections and other factors pose challenges 
to achieving this goal.  Ideas proposed to 
better engage consumers in fraud mitigation 
efforts included education campaigns, interac-
tive communication, and incentives.
II. Conference Background
  The Payment Cards Center and the EFTA 
co-sponsored a fraud-related conference (“Infor-
mation Security, Data Breaches, and Protecting 
Cardholder Information:  Facing up to the Chal-
lenges”) in September 2006.  In joining forces for 
the 2008 conference, the organizers wanted to 
extend the earlier discussions, going beyond the 
specific issue of data breaches to deal more direct-
ly with fraud-mitigation strategies and challenges.  
The conference structure was designed to reflect 
and examine new developments in payment card 
fraud and industry responses. Recognizing the 
interdependencies involved, the co-sponsors 
organized the discussions around the particular 
perspectives of payment system participants:  card 
issuers, consumers, acquirers and merchants, and 
the enabling payment networks.  (The conference 
agenda can be found in Appendix I.) 
III. Conference Day One
Keynote Address
  Jon Greenlee, Associate Director, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Divi-
sion of Banking Supervision and Regulation
  The conference began on Wednesday 
afternoon with welcome and introductory remarks 
by Peter Burns of the Payment Cards Center and 
H. Kurt Helwig of the EFTA.  Michael Collins, an 
executive vice president at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia and head of its Supervision, 
Regulation and Credit Department, introduced 
the keynote speaker, Jon Greenlee, whose address 
was titled “Regulatory Perspectives on Payment 
Card Fraud.”  Greenlee described how the Fed-
eral Reserve and other bank regulators have 
increased their attention to fraud and operational 
risk issues in retail payment systems.  While large 
dollar wholesale payment systems have historically 
been the focus of policymakers concerned about 
systemic risk, the growing size and scope of retail 
payment systems have not gone unrecognized.  He 
cited this conference and similar discussions at 
other Reserve Banks and the Board of Governors 
as evidence of this growing recognition.  
  At the heart of the issue is the critical role 
of consumer confidence in payment systems, espe-
cially as payments move to electronic platforms.  
To the extent that data breaches and related fraud 
and identity theft threaten consumer confidence 
in electronic payments, the system as a whole is 
threatened.
  Greenlee noted that while innovation in 
payments has resulted in greater consumer con-
venience and enhanced efficiency, there must 
be a corollary focus on the risk presented by new 
products, new providers, and new technolo-
gies.  Innovations and new technologies create 
additional complexities and involve a growing 
legion of third-party participants in the payment 
industry.  Greenlee stated that, as a result, there is 
more information residing outside of banks’ “four 
walls,” and because management of that informa-
tion (and related risk of compromise) is outside 
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challenges for FIs are changing.  
  At the same time, Greenlee also empha-
sized the importance of risk fundamentals, includ-
ing communication across functional areas as new 
products are developed.  In his experience, he 
has found it critical that risk assessment processes 
cross functional silos to identify any unanticipated 
consequences associated with new product or new 
process rollouts.  He closed by encouraging con-
ference participants to continue discussions that 
include all participants in the payment system in a 
search for collaborative solutions. 
Setting the Stage 
Moderator:   
 Peter Burns, Director, Payment Cards Center,
 Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Panelists:  
James Brown, Director, Center for Consumer
Affairs, School of Continuing Education, 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
Avivah Litan, Vice President and Distinguished 
Analyst, Gartner, Inc.
Richard Parry, Senior Vice President, Consumer 
Risk Management, JPMorgan Chase 
Paul Tomasofsky, President, Two Sparrows 
Consulting
 
  Following Jon Greenlee’s opening remarks, 
Peter Burns introduced the conference’s first panel 
by noting that this session was specifically struc-
tured to provide a broad overview of key elements 
in the dialogue about payment card fraud.  The 
session was titled “Setting the Stage” to emphasize 
that the topics to be discussed were intended to 
provide a context for the next day’s panels and 
raise general issues affecting all participants in the 
payment system.
  Richard Parry focused his initial remarks 
on how the proliferation of consumer banking 
products (e.g., prepaid cards and check elec-
tronification) and channels (e.g., Internet and 
telephone) has affected the basic profile of fraud 
risk.  He first spoke to the proliferation of remote 
banking access channels in the U.S., emphasizing 
the need to better understand the links between 
fraud and specific channels.  For example, he 
noted that while telephone fraud results in higher 
dollar losses, the Internet poses special threats 
because of its potential to lose a lot very quickly.  
With remote channels, FIs focus on securing the 
session.  What Parry described as the “real vulner-
ability” lies in the validation of customers’ identity 
at the time they open their accounts.  The “know 
your customer” process depends on forms of 
identification (driver’s license or utility bill) that 
can be easily doctored.  So the “gold standard lock 
on the door” for securing a remote session can be 
compromised, said Parry, because it’s fairly easy for 
a crook to obtain the “gold standard key.”  
  Further enabling criminals’ ability to im-
personate a customer, Parry continued, is “social 
engineering.”  Parry described a real-life scenario 
in which a perpetrator made 57 calls over a series 
of days to the credit card call center, the online 
banking department, and other areas of a bank in 
a continuing attempt to gain information to access 
and control an individual’s accounts.  Once armed 
with the information to “become the customer,” 
the fraudster drew down a home equity line of 
credit through an Internet banking session.  Parry 
used this example to describe how, within a bank-
ing organization, actions contributing to fraud are 
often segregated from the actual experience of 
fraud.  In this case, the credit card call center did 
not have a direct organizational line to the loss 
nor did the Internet banking department.  The de-
mand deposit account department was involved, 
since the money passed through that department 
on its way to the criminal.  But the actual finan-
cial loss occurred in the home equity loan depart-
ment, which had no managerial control over any 
of the areas that had been exploited by the crimi-
nals to achieve their objective.   
  Parry argued that more holistic efforts to 
prevent fraud are needed across the entire bank-
ing organization.  He also cautioned against over-
reliance on working groups focused on specific 
pieces of the fraud problem in achieving solutions.  
“When we look at it that way, we get fragmented 
solutions,” he said. 
  Next, Paul Tomasofsky shared his views 
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fraud levels and responses.  His comments were 
broadly speculative and fell into three areas:  1) 
What effect might changes in network ownership 
have?  2) How might new merchant strategies af-
fect risk exposure?  3) What are regulators doing, 
or thinking about doing, regarding these changes?
  Tomasofsky observed that there are no 
bank-owned credit card associations anymore.  
The electronic funds transfer (EFT) networks over 
which personal identification number (PIN) debit 
transactions travel have also largely migrated away 
from the bank-owned model.  While not arguing 
any particular outcome, Tomasofsky suggested 
that consideration should be given to whether 
changes in governance structures might lead to 
increased vulnerabilities.  In short, do networks 
owned by regulated banking companies provide 
stronger fraud protection than that coming from 
networks owned by nonbanks?  Extending that 
thought, he then asked whether a potentially less 
intensive focus on bank ownership interests might 
alter card network business strategies in ways 
that might lead to new fraud vulnerabilities.  For 
example, might networks consider opening card 
issuing to nonbanks, and if so, how would that 
affect the system’s risk profile?  Could merchants 
self-acquire, and if so, would the absence of an 
acquiring bank in the payment acceptance chain 
affect system risk?  As players compete with each 
other outside the association model, what addi-
tional risks might be introduced?
  Tomasofsky went on to say that merchants 
are actively looking at alternatives that will lower 
their costs of accepting payments.  As they do 
so, who is focusing on the risks associated with 
the introduction of these new schemes and new 
players, including nonbanks?  Expanded use of 
spontaneous ACH debits, remote draft capture, 
and alternative payment options may lead to lower 
merchant costs but may also be introducing new 
fraud risks into the broader payment system.  
  Furthermore, Tomasofsky observed that 
many new payment system players and technolo-
gies factor into his final point: regulation.  PayPal, 
for example, has grown appreciably in just eight 
years and has moved from a focus on Internet 
auction payments to all varieties of Internet pay-
ments.  Mobile could be next, and Tomasofsky 
asked if banks will be the players in mobile pay-
ments.  If they are not, then the question is, “Who 
will be watching them?”  He raised the concern 
of global fraud risk. U.S. laws don’t apply across 
borders.  What vulnerability may exist in the U.S. 
as other parts of the world adopt chip and PIN at 
the point-of-sale (POS)?  Will fraudsters target 
the U.S. because its mag-stripe technology makes 
it vulnerable?  The responsibilities and liabilities 
will become increasingly more complex, occasion-
ally even blurred.  Richard Parry interjected that 
compromise of data while traveling over telecom-
munication lines (data in motion) has already 
occurred in Indonesia, and he raised the question 
of who is liable in that event.  
  Avivah Litan began her remarks by agree-
ing with Parry’s earlier comments about creden-
tialing, noting that she believes that is one of the 
two most significant areas of weakness in mitigat-
ing the risk of fraud.  The other area, she argued, 
is the migratory aspect of fraud: It moves across 
organizations, channels, and products.  Crooks 
move from phone to retailers to ATMs.  The 
outlook is challenging.  Criminals keep devising 
new attack methods, using all kinds of sophisti-
cated techniques.  Many of the most accomplished 
criminals come out of eastern European countries 
and other areas remote from the U.S., where they 
operate with relative immunity.   
  Emphasizing the sophistication of today’s 
payment card fraudsters, Litan suggested that illic-
it operations provide the criminal community with 
services that mirror legitimate business models.  
There are Internet sites run by criminal gangs that 
provide access to stolen confidential information 
for a finite period of time for a set fee.  Litan cited 
an example where criminals have established a 
database time-sharing operation, set up on servers 
in Panama, allowing potential fraudsters to have 
access to stolen personal information for a defined 
amount of time, paying a fee for the time-share. 
  Litan described how criminals exploit 
other legitimate practices, such as online adver-
tising, in their efforts to steal consumer informa-
tion.  Online users click on what appears to be a 
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malware to their PCs, stealing keystrokes, creden-
tials (both graphics and text), and even security 
certificates stored on PCs.  
  Litan closed with two points that would be 
echoed throughout the conference:
1.  Now that retailers are storing fewer data, the 
crooks are more frequently hacking data in 
motion. As one door is closed to them, fraud-
sters open another.    
2.  Litan does not think that publicized retailer 
data breaches have materially affected con-
sumers’ shopping behavior or their use of 
payment cards.  She noted that after the 
much-publicized breach at TJ Maxx stores 
(TJX), the retailer reported increased revenue 
and growth in same-store sales.  As part of its 
post-breach efforts to encourage consumers 
to return to their stores, TJX held a “discount 
day.”  Customers not only returned, Litan re-
ported, but paid for their discounted purchas-
es with their cards.  There is no evidence that 
card use is declining in the face of breaches 
and reported fraud schemes.  In Litan’s view, 
this suggests that consumers feel confident 
that if their cards are used fraudulently, their 
banks will absorb the financial loss for them.
  James Brown picked up from there by shar-
ing what he refers to as “Brown’s Law #1”:  “The 
customer always pays; it’s just a question of who 
gets to break the news.”  The cost of fraud does 
make its way back to the consumer, but consum-
ers do not act on a cost experienced collectively 
in the same way as one experienced individually 
and directly.  Because of the “political calculus,” 
Brown does not anticipate changes that would 
place more liability on consumers.  Consumers 
vote; therefore, consumer protection mandates 
that have been built into the law institutional-
ize liability.  Holding customers liable is not good 
politics.   Therefore, Brown proposed that positive 
incentives to reward consumers for behavior that 
helps to mitigate fraud might have merit.
   During the discussion that followed the 
opening panelists’ remarks, a number of comments 
focused on the need to recognize the many inter-
dependencies inherent in today’s electronic pay-
ment environment.  The discussion highlighted 
the complex nature of the challenge and made it 
clear that effective solutions need to include all 
parties:  consumers, issuers, networks, and mer-
chants/acquirers. 
IV . Conference Day Two
Welcoming Remarks
  Charles Plosser, President, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia
  Charles Plosser’s opening remarks on 
the second day of the conference focused on the 
evolving threat of fraud and the importance of 
cooperation and collaboration among the vari-
ous segments of the payment card industry in the 
search for solutions.
  Plosser spoke to the increasingly complex 
security challenges that exist in today’s high-
technology and electronic-data-intensive card 
payment system.  While noting that electronic 
payment systems enable efficiency and welfare-en-
hancing outcomes, he also noted that they expose 
data to theft “in quantities that would not have 
been available in previous eras.”  The perpetrators 
are well-organized, professional, and well-funded 
criminal groups, operating domestically and 
internationally and using advanced technology in 
their efforts.  As Federal Reserve analyses have 
affirmed, the transformation from paper to elec-
tronic payments is continuing apace, creating new 
challenges and responsibilities for payment system 
participants.  Plosser emphasized that consumer 
confidence in the payment system is a critical con-
cern, obliging all who touch sensitive information 
to ensure its safety.
  Achieving this, Plosser continued, will 
require the cooperation of otherwise competi-
tive market participants, in cooperation with 
law enforcement and data security experts.  He 
recognized that the industry’s success in reducing 
fraud rates has been due in large measure to just 
such collaboration. He urged continued coopera-
tion, recognizing that “the card payment system’s 
integrity relies upon a set of interdependencies 
and a shared responsibility,” and he warned that 
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the battle by operating independently.  
  Reflecting on the structure of this con-
ference, Plosser noted that an important func-
tion of the Bank’s Payment Cards Center since 
its inception has been to create opportunities to 
bring differing perspectives together in a search 
for common solutions.  “It has been our experi-
ence,” Plosser observed, “that open and honest 
discourse … leads to the development of mean-
ingful insights that can help inform relevant policy 
debates.”  He concluded by challenging the group 
to work together constructively in this dialogue to 
maintain a safe environment for payments.
Consumer Perspective 
Moderator:   
Ed Wargo, Vice President, Customer 
Relationships, Javelin Strategy and Research
Panelists: 
Betsy Broder, Assistant Director, Division of 
Privacy and Identity Protection, Federal Trade 
Commission
Robert Shiflet, Global Consumer Fraud 
Preventions Executive, Bank of America
Tony Spinelli, Senior Vice President and Chief 
Security & Compliance Officer, Corporate 
Security and Compliance, Equifax, Inc.
  In introducing the Consumer Perspective 
panel, Kurt Helwig echoed Charles Plosser’s coun-
sel that consumer confidence is an imperative in 
the payment card business.  Protecting cardholder 
security and maintaining the integrity of the card 
payment system are not only the “right” things to 
do for consumers, but they also serve the business 
interests of card issuers, networks, merchants, and 
acquirers.  
  Ed Wargo took up this point in opening 
the panel discussion by reporting that a recent 
Javelin research survey found security to be in-
creasingly important to consumers in their deci-
sions to obtain and use payment cards.  Eighty-
four percent of respondents to Javelin’s October 
2007 survey rated “security against ID fraud” as 
“important” or “extremely important” to those 
decisions.  Survey respondents also indicated that 
they wanted to be engaged with their bank in anti-
fraud solutions.  They also said that they would 
be unlikely to shop at a retailer that had been 
hacked; however, Wargo went on to say, there 
are observable differences between what consum-
ers say they will do in surveys, and what actually 
occurs.  He offered the TJ Maxx experience as an 
example. Similarly, while consumers may say they 
want security, they also indicate that they do not 
want to experience inconvenience or disruption 
when conducting card transactions.  
  Overall, consumers have been slow to 
adopt self-protective security products and prac-
tices such as credit alert services and Internet 
shopping security tools.  Wargo attributed the 
somewhat contradictory aspect of consumers’ stat-
ed and actual preferences to their core expecta-
tions of “free, perfect, and now.”  Survey responses 
may accurately reflect what consumers prefer 
in an ideal scenario. In the real world, however, 
consumers encounter friction in the form of cost, 
time, and inconvenience that can cause actual 
behavior to deviate from their stated intentions.
  Betsy Broder acknowledged that consum-
ers’ low tolerance for friction creates a cost for 
fraud prevention, but she posited the idea that 
educational and marketing efforts might be ef-
fective in reshaping the public’s attitudes.  The 
public is hearing messages, and these messages are 
affecting their opinions and behavior.  
  Unfortunately, she told the assembly, 
sometimes efforts to engage and inform the public 
can be undermined by the confusing messages it 
receives.  As an example of that type of message, 
Broder mentioned a published report that used 
consumer complaint information compiled by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to rank banks 
according to their “customer security.”  While one 
of the FTC’s missions is to collect complaint in-
formation about identity theft and payment fraud, 
the data are not gathered in a way as to be scien-
tifically representative and were never intended 
to reflect individual banks’ security practices.  
Some banks are more proactive in making refer-
rals to the FTC, so their customers will be more 
represented in FTC complaint data than will less 
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are likely to have more customers making com-
plaints to the FTC than will banks with thousands 
or even tens of thousands of customers.  
  Unfortunately, the published report did 
not make these limitations clear and, as Broder 
noted, produced a ranking of bank safety that 
most analysts agreed was misleading, at best.  As 
Broder argued, there is a real need to provide in-
formation to consumers, but incorrect or mislead-
ing information can be counterproductive.
  Because of the limits of using customer-ini-
tiated reports in analytical work, Broder reported 
that the FTC is working with the Department of 
Justice to obtain hard data on 50,000 households 
that were victims.  The characteristics of the DOJ 
data are expected to facilitate meaningful analysis.  
The DOJ’s activity, however, will not change the 
FTC’s continuing efforts to collect consumer com-
plaint information because, as Broder emphasized, 
that endeavor remains important to the FTC.  
Information collected from consumers helps law 
enforcement to prosecute identity theft and is use-
ful in identifying patterns and enabling searches by 
ZIP code or other criteria.
  Broder next discussed the new “red flag” 
requirements effective November 1, 2008.  These 
rules require banks and lenders to have procedures 
and practices in place that would be triggered by 
warning signs (red flags) of identity theft.  Ex-
amples of warning signs could include alerts and 
notifications from various sources, suspicious or 
unusual activity related to a covered account, 
and suspicious addresses or documentation.  She 
reflected on events recounted previously where 
activity taking place in various parts of an orga-
nization led to identity theft that culminated in 
account fraud.  Broder said that the adoption of 
red flag rules should provide institutions with the 
structure to use what appear to be unrelated ac-
tivities as indicators of possible ID theft or poten-
tial fraud.  
  Robert Shiflet then described how Bank of 
America, in response to the type of cross-product, 
cross-channel activity Broder and others had 
described, had reorganized its fraud management 
structure to focus on the total customer relation-
ship.  Prior to this change, Shiflet said that Bank 
of America operated like most other organiza-
tions, conducting anti-fraud efforts largely within 
discrete product areas.  As Bank of America 
observed that newer fraud tactics were taking ad-
vantage of this separation of product areas in ways 
that affected the entire customer relationship, it 
recognized the need to change its strategic ap-
proach to combating fraud.  The response was to 
create anti-fraud efforts that span the enterprise, 
retaining expertise on individual product fraud 
while consolidating functional expertise under 
common management.  Of critical significance, 
Shiflet argued, this enterprise approach is consis-
tent with how consumers view their relationship 
with a bank.  Consumers expect their banks to 
know their total relationship with the bank and 
manage accordingly.  
  Shiflet described the aforementioned 
challenges of balancing fraud control with the 
customer experience in managing the customer 
relationship.  He described the particular dilemma 
presented when account numbers are compro-
mised in a data breach.  While a mass reissuance 
of cards with new account numbers is a highly 
effective fraud-prevention action, it also creates 
customer disruption and inconvenience.  Shiflet 
went on to say that, across the industry, 25 to 35 
percent of cards are being monitored because of 
potential compromise, but only a small fraction 
of those ultimately suffer fraud loss.1 Rather than 
mass reissuance, a better response, in his view, is 
to actively monitor and systematically evaluate for 
indicators of fraud risk.  This “surgical approach,” 
including targeted reissuance along with flagging 
and monitoring compromised accounts, provides 
effective fraud control without creating undue 
disruption and inconvenience for customers.
  Bank of America’s experience to date with 
this enterprise approach to fraud management has 
been encouraging and has led to new collabora-
tive efforts across business lines.  At the same time, 
and echoing some of the earlier comments, Shiflet 
noted that Bank of America recognizes the im-
1  analysis of four data breaches found that even in the breach with 
the highest rate of misuse, less than one in 1,000 (.098 percent) 
of compromised identities subsequently experienced fraud.  (the 
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portance of having its customers more engaged in 
efforts to mitigate fraud.
  Tony Spinelli began his remarks by not-
ing that the scope of consumer data risk is much 
broader than the information held by banks. Equi-
fax’s data suggest that “hacks” of financial services 
institutions account for only 15 percent of all 
data breaches, but 55 percent of data lost across 
all breaches is financially relevant.  His message 
was that all organizations, not just those that are 
directly a part of the payments chain, must recon-
sider what information needs to be stored and em-
ploy the same high degree of security in protecting 
that information.  In this respect, he concurred 
with the earlier point made that security in pay-
ments is part of a larger societal effort that has to 
be made to more effectively safeguard personal 
and confidential information.
  Spinelli revisited the theme of customer 
knowledge and awareness.  Two years ago, Equi-
fax conducted a study that revealed that many 
consumers did not know how to monitor their 
credit.  As a result, Equifax revamped its website 
to emphasize consumer education.  Expecting that 
consumers’ monitoring of their credit information 
would be a big factor in preventing identity theft, 
Equifax created website functionality that enables 
consumers to self-manage their credit monitoring 
service, clicking options and controls on and off 
in “real time.” Consumers can also perform these 
functions by telephone.  
  In response to a question asking what 
percent of consumers avail themselves of credit 
reporting, Spinelli acknowledged that it is “fairly 
low,” but he noted that “proactive sponsors” can 
achieve a response of about 15 percent.  The rise 
in response rate achieved by proactive efforts 
reinforced Broder’s point that consumer engage-
ment can be subject to positive influence.  Shiflet 
interjected that Bank of America has observed 
that customers who have proactively used a credit 
bureau service, such as credit monitoring, indicate 
higher satisfaction with the bank on customer 
satisfaction surveys.  
  Spinelli concluded with the observation 
that when looking at well-publicized data breach-
es, punishment focuses on companies and not on 
the malicious individuals.  He noted that of 137 
known breaches, perpetrators have been pros-
ecuted in only three.  Repeating the point raised 
by Avivah Litan, Spinelli noted that many of these 
criminals operate outside the United States, mak-
ing capture and prosecution more difficult. 
  Interesting observations and inferences 
were articulated during this panel discussion.  Con-
sumer research points to certain contradictions 
between statement and action.  Services designed 
to help consumers deter fraud were introduced to 
the market relatively recently, so adoption hasn’t 
occurred in numbers significant enough to provide 
sufficient fodder for analysis.  However, there is 
evidence that proactive delivery of information to 
consumers can raise adoption levels.  Some behav-
iors have been quantitatively observed, but under-
lying reasons have not been identified.  
  All of this suggests that consumers are in 
the early stages of understanding today’s risk envi-
ronment, its controls, and what role the consumer 
can play.  Likewise, the industry is in the nascent 
stages of understanding consumer attitudes and 
motivations.  But the bellwether learning points 
provided by these panelists suggest untapped op-
portunity in developing greater understanding of 
consumer behavior and preferences in this area, 
informing consumers’ opinions and ultimately 
engaging them in the fight against payment card 
and other forms of fraud.
Issuer Perspective 
Moderator: 
Harry DiSimone, Founder and CEO, Commerce 
Advisors, Inc.
Panelists: 
James Cichy, Vice President, Fraud Services, 
PULSE 
Richard Detura, Managing Director, Global 
Consumer Group Fraud Policy, Citigroup
Alex Mogielnicki, Senior Vice President, Risk & 
Knowledge Management, Chase Card Services
  After introductions by Harry DiSimone, 
Alex Mogielnicki launched the discussion by pre-
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ing the U.S. card industry’s progress in mitigating 
fraud over time.  Using a graph plotting fraud as 
a percent of card volume, he demonstrated that 
domestic credit card fraud trends have shown an 
impressive decline since 1990, when fraud losses 
equaled 12 basis points2 of total card volumes, 
declining to less than seven basis points in 2006.3  
He noted a series of industry innovations that 
factored into this decline, including CVV/CVC,4 
fraud scoring tools, terminal-based programs, 
and compromised account management systems 
(CAMS).  He noted that the industry’s successes 
have not come from a single solution but from 
the execution of multiple and interacting strate-
gies.  As he emphasized, there is no “silver bullet” 
in fraud management.  Instead, efforts to contain 
payment card fraud must focus on a combination 
of multiple tools and practices, evolving over time, 
implemented at different points in the payment 
chain: at the networks, at merchant locations, at 
issuing institutions, and also by consumers.  
  While the industry has made noteworthy 
advances in controlling fraud, Mogielnicki’s view 
of the future was less sanguine.  Citing threats 
from data compromises, card-not-present trans-
actions, cross-border exposures, social engineer-
ing, proliferation of usage channels, and other 
21st century realities, Mogielnicki predicted an 
increase in fraud loss rates over the next two 
years.  His predicted trend reversal will occur 
because of what he called the “ambient level of 
risk” existing in today’s environment.   The pay-
ment card industry is introducing new products in 
new channels and new markets that collectively 
create vulnerabilities for all participants:  issu-
ing and acquiring banks, networks, consumers, 
processors, and merchants.  Vulnerabilities from 
extra-industry sources are also part of this:  Hos-
pitals, libraries, and universities all get hacked.  
2 a basis point is equivalent to 1/100th of a percent. 
3 in 2006, domestic credit card fraud losses experienced by issuers 
of american express, discover, MasterCard, and visa were $1.24 
billion, or $0.0619 per $100 in spending volume. Nilson Report, 
issue 876 (March 2007).
4  Card verification value is a three-digit security number printed 
on the back of visa payment cards.  MasterCard’s equivalent is the 
card verification code.
Warehousing of data has facilitated the formation 
of illicit “identity bureaus” operating overseas.  
There is software that will produce a random ac-
count number with Mod 10 check.5  Alternative 
payment choices, such as PayPal, did not exist 10 
years ago.  E-commerce is growing in significance.  
There is bifurcation in POS, with the U.S. using 
magnetic-stripe technology and parts of the rest of 
the world adopting chip and PIN technology.  
  The combination of these factors, Mo-
gielnicki asserted, has produced a payment card 
environment that encompasses more diversity and 
more complexity than ever before, creating many 
new challenges for mitigating fraud.  Further, he 
noted that as the pace of change is accelerating, 
challenges are compounded exponentially rather 
than arithmetically.  
  Richard Detura told the group that the 
domestic trends described by Mogielnicki are also 
operating globally.  He augmented Mogielnicki’s 
point about POS bifurcation by presenting a graph 
(shown on page 15) that maps chip-card deploy-
ment in countries around the world.  Canada, Aus-
tralia, and much of Asia and Europe have imple-
mented chip-card programs or have plans to do 
so.  There are no immediate plans in the U.S. for 
large-scale chip-and-PIN programs.  This map be-
came a catalyst for comments and discussion about 
chip-card technology for the remainder of the day, 
as conferees considered the risk implications of this 
chip/nonchip schism for the U.S. market.
  Detura repeated a point made by earlier 
presenters: that fraud follows the path of least 
resistance.  Counterfeit plastic fraud becomes 
more difficult when POS is chip-enabled, so 
consequently, that type of fraud moves to non-
chip locations. Because of this, he sees the U.S. as 
being vulnerable to fraud in a way reminiscent of 
its situation when other countries adopted CVV/
CVC before the U.S., and fraud rose in some cases 
to the high teens (in basis points of volume).  But 
chip technology doesn’t eliminate fraud; it just 
5 also known as the Luhn algorithm for its creator, iBM scientist 
Hans Peter Luhn, Mod 10 is a patented checksum formula used 
to validate a variety of identification numbers, including payment 
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causes it to change form.  Experience in the Unit-
ed Kingdom and elsewhere suggests that where 
chip technology is dominant, fraud migrates6 to 
card-not-present channels and across borders to 
locations with different authorization routines.
  Detura’s observations of consumer be-
havior reinforced other comments that cardhold-
ers have little tolerance for interruption at the 
point of sale (POS).  They want to be involved in 
preventing fraud but not if it means POS inconve-
nience.  However, for fraud control tools such as 
neural networks to be effective, issuers have to be 
prepared to disrupt a POS transaction. As Detura 
explained, this is the dilemma facing issuers as 
they attempt to strike a balance between customer 
experience and effective fraud deterrence.
  James Cichy spoke about debit card fraud, 
which he said has characteristics similar to credit 
card fraud, along with some important differences.  
Debit is affected by the same trends occurring in 
credit card fraud.  Debit, however, experiences 
more PIN fraud, whereby perpetrators obtain cash 
rather than merchandise, than is seen on the credit 
card side.  Cichy suggested that the biggest differ-
ence is in the customer’s mindset about debit fraud.   
Despite similar network zero-liability rules, card-
holders have a higher level of concern when their 
funds on deposit are used fraudulently compared 
to fraudulent use of a credit line, which they don’t 
consider “their” money.  Debit card fraud, by defi-
nition, isn’t limited to the card alone.  Debit card 
fraud means a checking, savings, or money market 
account has also been accessed, which may height-
en the concern and inconvenience for the victim.  
While these concerns exist, Cichy observed that 
consumers are equally intolerant at having their 
debit card transactions disrupted as they are about 
interruptions of credit card transactions.  Cichy 
opined that consumer awareness of zero-liability 
protection counteracts their anxiety about fraud, 
even on their debit cards, sufficiently that desire for 
6  despite its success in decreasing domestic fraud on counterfeit 
and lost/stolen cards since its adoption of chip and Pin authoriza-
tion, the U.K. experienced record fraud losses in 2007.  Card-not-
present fraud grew 37 percent in 2007.  fraud more than doubled 
that year from counterfeited U.K. cards used outside the country.  
Cards &Payments (July 2008)
convenience at POS supersedes other concerns.
  Cichy concluded with thoughts about the 
need for communication and cooperation across 
organizations in developing strategies to mitigate 
fraud.  As an example, he advocated including 
fraud and risk specialists on project teams when 
developing new products or designing major 
marketing initiatives.  Having someone review 
concepts with an eye to possible fraud risks, he 
argued, will help to “bake in” fraud deterrence as 
strategies are being developed.
  Reflecting on the chip-PIN deployment 
map presented by Detura, Harry DiSimone posed 
the compelling question of whether chip-card 
adoption in the U.S. was “inevitable.”  This en-
gendered a vigorous discussion among the panel-
ists and members of the audience.  One line of 
discussion concerned the differences between the 
U.S. and non-U.S. markets.  Outside the U.S., ma-
jor issuers are also major acquirers, so the invest-
ment necessary to create a chip-card infrastruc-
ture on the acquiring side can be recouped by the 
organization in the form of lower fraud losses on 
the issuer side.  In the U.S., issuers and acquirers 
are generally separate firms with distinct revenue 
structures, where merchants would accrue less 
value from their investment in new card-accep-
tance hardware and software.  
  Another chip-card limitation discussed 
was related to the card-not-present environment, 
which Alex Mogielnicki reported accounts for 25 
to 30 percent (and growing) of card transactions.  
Adapting chip-PIN technology to Internet and 
other card-not-present environments presents 
obvious challenges.  If card-not-present transac-
tions are left unprotected, experience shows that 
fraud will move from the protected card-present 
environment to the Internet and other channels 
where chip and PIN technology is ineffectual.  
  Participants noted that the countries that 
have implemented chip technology may cover 
a lot of geography, but they are not necessarily 
where the most card transactions take place.  Par-
ticipants also observed that this is a relatively old 
technology.  This led to a discussion about a po-
tential “leap frog” from magnetic-stripe to a more 
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in the card-not-present environment, or perhaps 
one that would deliver additional value beyond 
fraud mitigation that could help rationalize the 
investment expense.  DiSimone argued that it is 
very difficult to make the business case7 for chip 
technology on the basis of fraud reduction alone, 
but he raised the question of whether the need 
for worldwide interoperability would eventually 
require the U.S. to issue chip cards.  While some 
participants used words like “inevitable” to express 
their support for chip and PIN deployment in the 
7  in its March 29, 2008, issue of Strategic Commentary, Speer & 
associates, inc. estimates a cost of over $10 billion to make the 
U.S. compliant with card network standards for chip cards.  the 
article also reports that countries that have implemented chip cards 
have been successful in reducing fraud rates, but rates of fraud 
prior to implementation were measurably higher than current U.S. 
experience. The article also notes the “long-payback period that is 
typical in most countries,” noting that the Canadian conversion to 
eMv will cost in excess of $1 billion, with fraud savings projected 
at “a minimum of $100 million annually once ‘chip and Pin’ have 
been fully implemented.” 
U.S., there was no clear consensus on whether 
this is likely to occur any time soon.  Nevertheless, 
the fact that the issue generated such debate led 
some attendees to propose that resources might 
be devoted to researching the potential impact of 
chip and PIN deployment in the U.S. market. 
Network Perspective 
Moderator: 
Ron Congemi, Chairman, EFTA
Panelists: 
Jodi Golinsky, Vice President, Regulatory & 
Public Policy Counsel, MasterCard Worldwide
Mark O’Connell, President and CEO, Interac 
Association and Acxsys Corporation
Russell Schrader, Associate General Counsel, 
Global Enterprise Risk, Visa Inc.
 
  In introducing the panel, Ron Congemi 
noted the unique position of networks in man-
 
EMV Chip Deployment 
Countries in which one or more banks are preparing to migrate, 
are migrating, or have completed migration to EMV 
Countries where penetration of  EMV cards, EMV 
POS or EMV ATMs exceeds 50%  
Countries with no EMV Chip Deployment 
Countries in which one or more banks are preparing to 
migrate, are migrating, or have completed migration to 
EMV 
Countries with no EMV Chip 
Deployment  
Countries where penetration of EMV cards, 
EMV POS or EMV ATMs exceeds 50%  
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aging the integrity of the card payment system 
throughout the fraud “life cycle,” from preven-
tion to investigation to remediation.  He noted 
that this begins with standards and how they are 
implemented and monitored.  PCI is one set of 
standards adopted by the networks in their efforts 
to control fraud.  
  Jodi Golinsky recapped the evolution of 
PCI-DSS from its origin as several discrete sets of 
standards established by individual networks to 
one common set, established by an open standards 
body, the PCI Security Council.  PCI standards ar-
ticulate 12 major data security steps, a PIN-entry 
device security program (PED DSS), a payment 
application security program (PA-DSS), and a 
self-assessment questionnaire.  Collectively, these 
provide a “road map” for adoption and compli-
ance.  In addition to establishing and enforcing 
standards, the networks also have an obligation to 
encourage the understanding and adoption of PCI 
standards.  Two years ago, Golinsky acknowledged, 
the program was not as widely accepted as the 
networks would have liked.  Since then, commu-
nication and education efforts, especially related 
to data breach risks, have rapidly improved aware-
ness and compliance in the merchant community.  
The merchant community now, Golinsky noted, 
no longer asks why they must be PCI-compliant, 
but rather how they can become so.  
  However, in the aftermath of breaches at 
retailers that were believed to be PCI-compliant, 
some critics have called PCI standards into ques-
tion.  Golinsky responded that MasterCard is not 
aware of any compromise of a PCI-compliant 
merchant and emphasized that PCI compliance 
is a “journey, not a destination”; vigilance, not 
compliance dates, is critical.  And, she concluded, 
like other efforts to mitigate fraud, PCI is a critical 
piece but not a panacea; fraud cannot be reduced 
by any one party or program.  It requires holistic 
efforts by all key stakeholders.
  Speaking next, Mark O’Connell concurred 
that there is no single resolution for dealing with 
fraud.  Although Canada’s not-for-profit Interac 
debit card brand is moving forward this year with 
chip and PIN, Interac’s research shows that chip 
cards alone won’t eliminate fraud.  O’Connell 
reported that as the United Kingdom moves to 
chip-card technology, it is seeing fraud move 
across borders, as well as to online and other 
card-not-present channels.  “All wars,” O’Connell 
observed, “are fought on multiple fronts and that 
is true in the war against fraud.”   
  Canada, with an economy roughly equal to 
that of California, hopes to learn from and avoid 
some of the pitfalls encountered by the U.K.  Still, 
it is not depending solely on chip cards and PIN 
use to reduce fraud.  Interac continues to develop 
rules-based fraud management tools to augment 
neural network applications.
  O’Connell briefly discussed Canada’s deci-
sion to move forward with chip cards.  Canada has 
no signature debit product.  Instead, its Interac 
EFT network is used to support PIN-POS at Ca-
nadian merchants.  Beginning in 2000, skimming 
schemes that captured card numbers along with 
their PINs subjected the Interac system to annual 
increases in fraud loss of about 25 percent.  As 
Canada’s largest payment brand, Interac had to ar-
rest this trend, and the company decided that chip 
cards were the solution.  
  O’Connell acknowledged that differences 
between the Canadian and U.S. banking, regula-
tory, payment card, and retailing environments 
would mean that different rationales would be 
used if a similar decision were to be made in the 
United States.  For example, he noted that the 
Canadian government maintains fairly sweeping 
power to regulate private card networks.  Cana-
dian regulations also allow for collaboration and 
information-sharing among competitors.  This 
cooperation was the cornerstone for the migra-
tion to chip cards.  While Canada, like the U.S., 
has a bifurcated issuer and acquirer structure, the 
conditions in Canada enabled a consensus to form 
around a common belief that fraud is a collective 
problem requiring a shared solution.
  Returning to the network environment in 
the United States, Russ Schrader described the 
following roles and responsibilities of networks in 
mitigating payment card fraud:
1.  Setting standards, including PCI, which 
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but an audit for practices that really should be 
implemented.”  He commented on the evolv-
ing nature of PCI standards as new knowledge 
makes its way into the revision of standards.
2.  Acting as a clearinghouse for issuers who call 
with information about potential fraud they 
may be seeing and with questions about what 
others are seeing, and what is being observed 
centrally at the network.
3.  Investigating fraud and conducting forensics.
4.  Disseminating information.  Schrader provided 
CAMS alerts as an example while also noting 
that merely because a card number appears on 
a CAMS alert does not mean fraud has hap-
pened or will happen.  Issuers independently 
decide how to treat their accounts identified 
as part of a CAMS alert.
5.  Educating, through webinars, government 
testimony, and working with regulators.
6.  Providing alternative means of dispute resolution.  
Schrader observed that litigation is “neither a 
cost-effective nor satisfactory solution on an 
ongoing basis.”
7.  Interfacing with law enforcement.  “These are 
international cybercrimes,” Schrader stated, 
“and we need to get to the root problem.”  
He reported that Visa has found that col-
laboration with law enforcement agencies in 
the Asia Pacific region and Europe has been 
effective in shutting down off-shore criminal 
organizations.  
  In the discussion subsequent to the panel-
ists’ remarks, some attendees argued that network 
rules and standards do not always result in appro-
priate allocation of costs associated with mitigat-
ing fraud.  Specifically with respect to PCI stan-
dards, some felt that a disproportionate burden 
falls on merchants.  Others suggested that because 
of the central role played by networks in payment 
systems, they are in the best position to safely 
hold transaction information, minimizing the risk 
of data compromises at the merchant level.  All 
agreed that fighting fraud requires collaboration 
among all sectors of the industry.  
Merchant Acquirer Perspective 
Moderator:   
Marc Abbey, Partner, First Annapolis Consulting
Panelists:  
Donald Boeding, Senior Vice President, General 
Manager of Merchant Services, Fifth Third Bank 
Processing Solutions 
Robert Carr, Chairman and CEO, Heartland 
Payment Systems
Mike Herman, Chief Compliance Officer, Chase 
Paymentech
    
  As the moderator for the final panel of 
the conference, Marc Abbey observed that it was 
somewhat telling that none of the earlier panels 
had explicitly considered merchants that had been 
criminally hacked as victims of crimes, although 
they certainly were.  Merchants and acquirers also 
experience financial loss and potentially dimin-
ished reputation from these cybercrimes, and they 
have strong motivation to reduce their vulnerabil-
ity to data breaches.  He articulated some of the 
challenges and complexities facing merchants and 
their acquirers noting that such challenges may 
not be commonly known and appreciated.  
  Approximately 6 million merchants in 
the United States accept payment cards.  Many 
of them have multiple outlets, and many have 
multiple sales channels (storefronts, websites, 
and catalogs).  Myriad applications are needed to 
interface with dial terminals, electronic cash regis-
ters, mail order, and other platforms. Value-added 
resellers (VARs)8 compound the complexity of the 
merchant processing business by requiring another 
layer of systems integration for acquirers. Yet, Ab-
bey noted, industry fraud losses have varied within 
the same range for the last 15 years, an indication 
that acquirers, along with the rest of the industry, 
are being proactive in fraud control.  Acquirers, he 
continued, can manage their exposure by opting 
in or out of industries and environments where 
risk is highly concentrated.  It is well-known, for 
example, that credit and fraud exposure is higher 
8  Value-added resellers are software companies that offer technol-
ogy solutions that include a payment interface.18    Maintaining a Safe environMent for PayMent CardS www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
in the airline industry than in other merchant 
categories.  Payment fraud also varies by merchant 
sales channel, with an estimated 30 percent of 
card fraud occurring in card-not-present environ-
ments.  Acquirers can opt in or out of these busi-
nesses, depending on their tolerance for risk and 
their tools to manage it.
  There are also different risk profiles among 
small and large merchants.9  Donald Boeding’s 
firm acquires for many large merchants.  As the 
acquirer for TJ Maxx, he has also had experience 
in managing situations in which a large number of 
data are compromised.  
  Boeding said that large merchants have 
made investments in data security and are moti-
vated to proceed with PCI-DSS and not merely 
because it is a requirement; merchants know 
that it is good business.  The data breach at TJ 
Maxx reported in early 2007 added to the sense 
of urgency.  Along with the impetus of network 
deadlines for PCI compliance, high-profile retailer 
data compromises accelerated the pace of PCI 
compliance so that Boeding was able to report 
that, at the time of the conference, 80 percent of 
the industry’s largest (Level I) merchants were 
PCI-compliant, compared to 30 percent in Janu-
ary 2007.  
  Still, Boeding questioned whether an 
entity can ever be absolutely PCI compliant.  The 
status can change in a minute.  The standards, he 
argued, are very black and white, but when you 
apply them, there are shades of grey.
  Robert Carr discussed the challenges faced 
at the other end of the merchant spectrum among 
smaller brick-and-mortar locations, often with 
dial-terminal operations, many doing less than 
1,000 card transactions per year.  These merchants 
present a different and, Carr asserted, generally 
lower risk profile than large, multi-location mer-
chants on wireless networks, doing business over 
9  As defined by Visa Inc., merchants fall into one of four size 
categories determined by number and type of payment card 
transactions per year:  Level i – over 6 million transactions per 
year; Level ii – 1 million to 6 million transactions per year; Level 
III – 20,000 to 1 million e-commerce transactions per year; Level 
IV – fewer than 20,000 e-commerce transactions/year and all other 
merchants processing up to 1 million transactions a year (visa’s 
website).
the Internet or in other card-not-present venues.  
Yet all merchants, Carr stated, are obliged to com-
ply with the same set of PCI standards.  A more 
efficient solution, he observed, would be to define 
standards that best suit the different merchant 
environments.
  To further emphasize the differences, Carr 
noted that “small merchants are not small mind-
ed, but PCI is not their top-of-mind concern.”  
Small businesses are focused on getting employees 
to work and getting product stocked.  While large 
retailers employ individuals specifically to manage 
payment costs and processes, small merchants do 
not have specialists of this type.  Carr revisited 
the topic of VARs mentioned by Marc Abbey, 
stating that some VARs have written code into 
their products that, in violation of network rules, 
captures and stores payment card information as 
an auxiliary feature of the software.  Many of the 
small merchants who purchase the VAR’s product 
are not aware that this function exists, nor do they 
use the stored information.  By extension, they are 
unaware that they are out of compliance with PCI 
standards. 
  This situation has transpired because, Carr 
contended, until recently the networks have not 
been aggressive in monitoring VAR certification.  
This has allowed vulnerabilities at these merchant 
locations.  He anticipates that the new require-
ments established by the networks for certifying 
software will be a major improvement.  These will 
initially apply to certifying new software, after 
which software currently in use that is not compli-
ant will be decertified. 
  In his remarks, Mike Herman agreed with 
Carr’s point that small merchants do not present 
the same risk nor do they have the same resources 
for complying with PCI requirements.  He fur-
ther argued that emphasis on large merchants 
conforms to the 80-20 rule: Concerted efforts 
to achieve PCI compliance in 20 percent of the 
system will accomplish central objectives for 80 
percent of the transactions.  
  Adding to the discussion of differences 
among merchant types and their PCI compliance 
challenges, Herman introduced another aspect of 
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chants.  These global retailers deal with multi-
currency software applications and must have 
data security structures that reflect variations in 
requirements by the networks and governments 
in different regions of the world.  Despite all of 
these challenges, however, Herman stressed that 
the objectives of PCI-DSS — to ensure that cards 
remain the most secure form of consumer pay-
ment in all environments — must be upheld.  He 
contended that collaboratively developed indus-
try solutions will result in better outcomes than 
governmental or regulatory alternatives.  He also 
concurred with the comments of others that there 
is no single perfect way to prevent payment card 
fraud.  PCI plays a critical role, but it is not a 100 
percent solution, nor is it a solution 100 percent 
of the time.  It does, he maintained, play a critical 
role in protecting the integrity of the card pay-
ment system.
  In the ensuing discussion, there was debate 
about the application of PCI data protection 
standards to various merchant categories.  Some 
participants argued that PCI standards represent 
commonsense security practices that merchants 
of all sizes — indeed, anyone handling sensitive 
information — should have in place.  Others chal-
lenged the view that the needs of small merchants 
were not being addressed, noting that the PCI 
process logically  focused first on the sources of 
highest transaction volume and that attention 
has been given to the special issues facing smaller 
merchants.  A discussion ensued regarding which 
pieces of transaction information merchants were 
required to maintain for chargeback purposes 
(network requirements) versus what is being kept 
voluntarily by merchants to facilitate returns 
and exchanges. While no specific proposals were 
made, there was a sense that all players in the 
system need to work together to minimize the 
amount of sensitive data maintained by merchants 
to conduct business. 
 
V . Conclusions
    While payment card fraud has existed 
since the introduction of cards into the payment 
stream, the highly publicized data breaches in 
recent years have created, in the words of Marc 
Abbey, an “inflection point” that focused at-
tention on this subject from all fronts.  This 
broadened base of public and industry concern 
has galvanized action across the entire payments 
chain.  This important development recognizes 
that perpetrators of fraud do not limit their at-
tempts to exploit vulnerabilities to only one link 
of the chain.  They will hack merchants, phish 
consumers, and use social engineering to extract 
information from issuers.  
  Because fraud occurs in many ways, there 
is also no “silver bullet” that will radically diminish 
fraud.  The industry’s historical success in control-
ling payment card fraud has evolved over time 
as the result of a combination of many tools and 
practices:  card activation, card verification codes, 
neural networks, consumer education, network 
alerts, address verification services, and real-time 
POS authorization, to name but a few.  The con-
ference discussion included many examples of how 
our increasingly complex payments environment 
and the growing capabilities of criminals are com-
bining to raise the bar in meeting the challenge of 
ensuring a safe and secure environment for con-
sumers in their use of payment cards.  Participants 
also agreed that effective strategies for mitigating 
fraud will depend on engaging all stakeholders.
  While the subject of chip and PIN deploy-
ment has been debated for years, discussion at 
this event suggested that the tenor of the debate 
is changing.  As more of the world moves toward 
this advanced authorization technology, there is a 
growing concern that the U.S. and its magnetic-
stripe technology may become a growing target 
for fraudsters stymied by chip and PIN regimes 
elsewhere.  Conferees recognized the value of 
chip-card deployment in the U.S. for its potential 
to control fraud and also as a step toward greater 
interoperability with other countries that have 
adopted, or have plans to implement, chip and 
PIN.  
  Despite the sense that deployment of chip 
cards in the U.S. may be inevitable, participants 
recognized that, to be successful, the technol-
ogy needs to be adapted to the card-not-present 
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and fraud are growing.  And while chip technol-
ogy is no longer cutting edge, deployment would 
still carry an expensive price tag for both issuers 
and acquirers/merchants, raising the question 
of whether the industry should look to a more 
advanced solution if a major investment is to be 
made.
  Awareness also emerged that even with 
concerted efforts by all segments of the card pay-
ment system, the risk of compromised information 
and the resulting fraud are part of the larger milieu 
and cannot be completely controlled within the 
payment card system.  Banking-related informa-
tion can and is obtained for illicit purposes from 
nonfinancial institutions, such as universities and 
medical facilities, which collect personal informa-
tion.  Bringing criminals to justice also lies outside 
the purview of the payment system, but some at 
the conference recognized the collaboration that 
exists (and continues to advance) between law 
enforcement and card industry players.  Indeed, 
since the conference was held, 11 individuals 
from five countries were arrested in connection 
with the data theft at TJX and other merchants.  
While arrest and prosecution will not provide an 
unqualified deterrent to cyber crime, these arrests 
do demonstrate that even in complex schemes dis-
tributed across several continents and conducted 
with a shield of invisibility, perpetrators can be 
identified and captured.
  While the conference discussions did not 
focus on specific proposals, a number of critical 
insights were explored and new directions for 
further research identified.  As several participants 
noted, a key element to achieving a successful 
and productive dialogue was the inclusion of the 
multiple perspectives represented in the meeting.  
Successfully addressing the many new challenges 
in combating fraud in the modern payment card 
system cannot be done within separate areas of 
the industry.  Better understanding of each other’s 
unique roles in this effort is a critical prerequisite 
to developing successful solutions.Maintaining a Safe environMent for PayMent CardS    21  www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
Maintaining a Safe Environment for Payment Cards: Examining Evolving Threats Posed by Fraud
A conference jointly sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Payment Cards Center and the 
Electronic Funds Transfer Association (EFTA)
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
Welcome and Introductory Remarks
Peter Burns, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
H. Kurt Helwig, Electronic Funds Transfer Association 
Michael Collins, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Keynote Address: Regulatory Perspectives on Payment Card Fraud
Jon Greenlee, Associate Director, Operations and IT Risk Section, Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
Managing Payment Fraud Risk in a Challenging Environment: Setting the Stage
Moderator:  Peter Burns, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
Panelists:  James Brown, University of Wisconsin
  Avivah Litan, Gartner Inc.
Richard Parry, JPMorgan Chase   
Paul Tomasofsky, Two Sparrows Consulting 
Thursday, April 24, 2008
Welcome
Charles Plosser, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Consumer Perspective
Moderator:  Ed Wargo, Javelin Strategy & Research 
Panelists:  Betsy Broder, Federal Trade Commission
  Robert Shiflet, Bank of America 
  Tony Spinelli, Equifax 
Issuer Perspective
Moderator:  Harry DiSimone, Commerce Advisors, formerly EVP of Chase Card Services
Panelists:   James Cichy, PULSE   
    Richard Detura, Citigroup 
    Alex Mogielnicki, JPMorgan Chase
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Network Perspective
Moderator:  Ron Congemi, EFTA
Panelists:  Jodi Golinsky, MasterCard Worldwide
    Mark O’Connell, Interac Association and Acxsys Corporation
Russell Schrader, Visa Inc.
Merchant Acquirer Perspective
Moderator:  Marc Abbey, First Annapolis Consulting
Panelists:  Donald Boeding, Fifth Third Bank 
  Robert Carr, Heartland Payment Systems 
    Michael Herman, Chase Paymentech Solutions 
     
Wrap-Up: What Have We Learned?
Participants:   Panel moderators and conference organizersMaintaining a Safe environMent for PayMent CardS    23  www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
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NYCE Payments Network, LLC
Online Resources
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP  
PayPal
PCI Security Standards Council
PSC   
PULSE
SWACHA
Transaction Network Services  
TransUnion
Two Sparrows Consulting
U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of PA










Vice President and Director
Bob Hunt
Assistant Vice President
The Payment Cards Center was established to serve as a source of knowledge and expertise on this important segment 
of the financial system, which includes credit cards, debit cards, smart cards, stored-value cards, and similar payment 
vehicles.  Consumers’ and businesses’ evolving use of various types of payment cards to effect transactions in the economy 
has potential implications for the structure of the financial system, for the way that monetary policy affects the economy, 
and for the efficiency of the payments system.
“The Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia will 
be widely recognized as a 
leader and innovator in 
central bank knowledge 
and service.”
Charles I. Plosser
President